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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF. THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 16863 
FRANK VLACIL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant was convicted of violating Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-10-503 which prohibits the possession 
of a dangerous weapon by a person who is not a citizen of 
the United States. At the time of the incident forming the 
basis of this case, the appellant was a Czechoslovakian 
native found to have been in possession of a firearm .. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged by information with the 
commission of a third degree felony under U.C.A. § 76-10-503. 
The appellant was convicted of violating the provisions of 
this statute in a jury tria~ the Honorable Boyd Bunnell of 
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the Seventh Judicial District in and ~or Carbon County, 
presiding. Upon conviction, the appellant was sentenced 
to serve a term of confinement in the Utah State Prison, 
not to exceed £ive years~ 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks an order and judgment upholding 
the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 and 
affirming the conviction in the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the evening of February 21, 1979, James Cruz, 
intent on an evening of drinking, and socializing, took a 
taxi cab.to the Eagle's Club in Price, Utah (T.14). As 
Cruz and a group of friends arrived at the club, they noticed 
another friend, the appellant, had already arrived (T.15). 
Shortly thereafter, the appellant and Cruz engaged in a 
heated discussion about the attendance and membership policy 
of the club which refuses non-members entrance after the 
third visit unless a commitment to join is made (T.15). 
The appellant had visited the club on three occasions prior 
to the evening of February 21, and was thus ineligible to 
enter without membership (T.15). The argument evolved into 
a fight between the two men which ended when the appellant 
was forcibly ejected from the club (T.16). At approximately 
12:30 a.m., Cruz and the group left the club and proceeded to 
-2-
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a bar owned jointly by Cruz and Ann A~chibald (T.15,16). 
Shortly after arriving at this bar, a bullet was fired 
from the outside, through a window of the bar (T.19,20). 
Patrons at the bar looked· outside and saw the appellant 
holding a gun (T.20). Cruz went outside in an attempt to 
·calm the appellant (T. 2 0 ,25) . As Cruz approached, the 
appellant commanded him to stay away or he would kill him 
(Cruz) (T.28). After the appellant jammed the gun several 
times into Cruz's face (T.25), Cruz began to back away from 
the appellant (T.25). Cruz had backed approximately 
fifteen feet from the appellant when he shot Cruz through 
the shoulder (T.25). Later, at approximately 2:00 a.m., 
the appellant was arrested as he was sitting in his van 
(T.56,57). As police officers looked through the driver's 
side window of the van, the gun used in the previous shooting 
was discovered and seized (T.57). 
part that: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
STATE AND NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
CONCERNING THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, GUARANTEE 
COLLECTIVE RATHER THAN INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
ALLOWING LEGISLATURES TO REGULATE THE POSSES-
SION OF ARMS PURSUANT TO TRADITIONAL STATE 
POLICE POWERS. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503 states in pertinent 
(1) Any person who is not a citizen of the 
-3-
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United States, or any person who has been 
convicted of any crime of violence under 
the laws of the United States, the State 
of Utah, ·or any other state, government, 
or country, or who is addicted to the use 
of any narcotic drug, or any person who 
has been .declared mentally incompetent 
shall not own or have in his possession or 
under his custody or control any dangerous 
weapon as defined in this part. Any person 
who violates this .section is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous 
weapon is a firearm or sawed-off shotgun, 
he shall be guilty of a felony of the 
third .degree. 
The appellant, who was convicted of possession of a firearm 
by a person who is not a citizen of the United States, alleges 
that the above code section is violative of provisions of· the 
state and national constitutions. The Second Amendment to 
the United States Constitution provides that, nA well-regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed." Correspondingly, Article I Section 6 of the 
Utah Constitution states: "The people have the right to bear 
arms for their security and defense, but the Legislature 
may regulate the exercise of this right by law." In the 
case of United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1938), the 
United States Supreme Court addressed fears similar to those 
expressed by the appellant in the case at bar. ·That case 
concerned the National Firearms Act under which the appellant 
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was convicted for transporting a saweq-off shotgun in 
interstate commerce. The Court examined the historical 
foundation of the Second Amendment and stated: 
The Constitut~on as originally adopted 
granted to the Congress power-"To provide 
for calling forth the Militia to execute 
the Laws of the Unibn ... ; To provide 
for organizing, arming, and disciplining, 
the Militia, and for governing such part 
of them as may be employed in the Service 
of the United States, reserving to the 
States respectively, the Appointment of 
the Officers, and the Authority of training 
the Militia according to the discipline 
prescribed by Congress." With obvious 
purpose to assure the continuation and 
render possible the effectiveness of such 
forces the declaration and guarantee of 
the Second Amendment were made. It must 
be interpreted and applied with that end 
in view. 
307 U.S. at 178. In short, the Second Amendment right to 
keep and bear arms refers directly to the states' right to 
maintain a militia, but not to the right of an individual 
to possess a firearm. Such was the holding of the court 
in Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1971): 
Since the Second Amendment right "to keep 
and bear Arms" applies only to the right 
of the State to maintain a militia and not 
to the individual's right to bear arms, 
there can be no serious claim to any express 
constitutional right of an indiv~dual to 
possess a firearm. 
·At 149. Accordingly, the courts have come to a general 
concensus that the Second Amendment guarantees a collective 
rather than an individual right. United States v. Warin, 
-5-
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530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976), cer.t. den. 426 u.s .. 948. 
Likewi.se, state courts when dealing with claims 
of unconstitutional gun control statutes, apply the 
Second Amendment in a manner similar to federal courts .. 
In Harris v. State, 432 P.2d 929 (Nev. 1967)_, the court 
stated, referring to the Second Amendment's application 
to the Nevada gun control law: "That the amendment applies 
only to the Federal Government and does not restrict state 
action • • • The right to bear arms does not apply to 
private citizens as an individual right." At 930. 
Similarly, the c,ourt in Commonwealth v. Davis, 343 N.E.2d 
847, 850 (Mass. 1976) again, referring to the Second 
Amendment stated: 
The chances appear remote that this amendment 
will ultimately be read to control the States, 
for unlike some other provisions of the bill 
of rights, this is not directed to guaranteeing 
the rights of individuals, but rather, as we 
have said, to assuring some freedom of the 
State forces from national interference. 
The underlying basis for holding that the Second 
Amendment allows restrictions to be placed on the possession 
of firearms by individuals, can be traced to the Tenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution: "The powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the p~ople. " Under this amendment, the 
-6-
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states have the power to enact laws appropriate for 
protecting the health and welfare of the people. This 
general police power allows the state to legislate in 
the field of gun control. In People v. Garcia, 595 P.2d 
228, 230 (Colo. 1979), the Colorado Supreme Court stated, 
"The right to bear arms is not absolute, and it can be 
restricted by the state's valid exercise of its police 
power." Similarly, the Nevada Supreme Court in Hardison v. 
State, 437 P.2d 868, 871 (Nev. 1968) noted, "[T]he Second 
Amendment right is not absolute. The provision only applies 
to the federal government, and absent federal or state 
constitutional restraints the authority to regulate weapons 
comes from a state's police powers. This is a valid subject 
for state regulation." 
A similar holding is appropriate in the present 
case. Pursuant to Article I Section 6 of the Utah Constitution, 
"The people have the right to bear arms for their security 
and defense, but the Legislature may regulate the exercise 
of this right by law." The Utah Code section 76-10-503 is 
simply a manifestation of the Legislature exercising its 
right, pursuant to the state constitution, to regulate the 
people's right to bear arms. There is no question that 
the Legislature had the power and right to enact Utah Code 
Ann. 76-10-503. State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813, 814 
-7-
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(Utah 1974). In address_ing a Fourteenth Amendment equal 
protection attack on the statute involved here, this 
Court stated: "The sale, use and possession of firearms 
are proper -subjects of regulation by the State. The 
Fourteenth Amendment is not generally applied so as to 
restrict the exercise of police powers by the state." 
This Court concluded its analysis of the issues by holding: 
The statute under consideration was directed 
toward the safeguarding of the public peace 
and security and is thus a proper exercise 
of the police powers. It appears that the 
legislature determined that the possession 
of firearms by-aliens was harmful, and we 
do not quarrel with the decision of that 
body. 
At 815. Thus, not only is the disputed statute a constitutional 
exercise of the state's police powers, but where such powers 
of regulation are expressly granted to the legislature by 
the state constitution, this Court has given great deference 
to the decision of that body. Therefore, the Court's 
decision in the case at bar should support and follow the 
precedent of State v. Beorchia, supra. 
The appellant distinguishes the present statute 
from similarly drawn statutes on the premise that the instant 
statute "prohibit~" rather than "regulates" the possession 
of firearms. Such a distinction is, however, invalid when 
contrasted against the nature of provisions guaranteeing the 
-8-
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right to bear arms. These provisions'· as previ.ously 
stated, confer a collective right only; no individual 
rights are involved. Therefore, only a statute which 
makes a collective prohib.ition may be characteri.zed as 
absolutely prohibiting possession of firearms. Were 
this not so, a statute prohibiting the possession of 
firearms by persons convicted of felonies (also a class 
of individuals) , would contain the same potential 
constitutional infirmity advocated by the appellant in 
the present case. However, statutes prohibiting the 
possession of firearms by felons have been unanimously 
upheld as a valid exercise of state police powers. Since 
the present statute does not collectively prohibit the 
possession of firearms by the people of this state, the 
appellant's attack must be rejected. 
The appellant assails the instant statute on the 
ground that cases cited by this Court in Beorchia dealt 
with statutes promulgating qualified prohibitions, i.e., 
aliens are prohibited from possessing firearms except in 
situations of individual self-defense. It should be noted 
that this Court did not rely upon Ex Parte Rameriz, 226 
P. 914 (Cal. 1924) and Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 
138 (1915) , for the entire rationale of the Beorchia 
opinion; rather these two cases are cited to support the 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
proposition that a statute such as Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
503 which is directed toward the safeguarding of the public 
peace and security, is the proper exercise 0£ the police 
powers. 530 P.2d at 815. Since the above cases were noted 
for the general proposition that statutes addressed to 
safeguarding the public peace and security are a valid 
exercise 0£ police powers to which Fourteenth Amendment 
restrictions are generally not applied, the superficial 
legal distinction mentioned by appellant is not sufficient 
to compel a result contrary to Beorchia. 
In the event that a self-defense distinction were 
valid in the present case, the appellant still could not 
prevail since self-defense was not involved here. In 
other words, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 is not unconstitutiona: 
as applied to the appellant since the incident which 
precipitated the arrest, the shooting of Cruz, was not an 
act of self-defense. Although, after the first shot through 
the window of the bar, Cruz left the bar and approached the 
appellant to calm him down, the appellant shot Cruz as Cruz 
was backing away from the appellant (T. 25, 30 ,48) • Therefore, 
even if the possession of a firearm by an alien should be 
allowed under the· Utah Code for purposes of self-defense, 
the statute was constitutionally applied to the appellant. 
He has no standina to assert a cause based on the prosecution 
;.) 
of an alien under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 who may have 
=-10-
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peacefully or justifiably used or possessed a firearm. 
POINT II 
STATE LAWS WHICH AFFECT ALIENS BY 
REGULATING THEIR USE AND POSSESSION 
OF FIREARMS, ARE NOT PREEMPTED BY 
THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION SINCE SUCH 
REGULATIONS DO NOT IMPINGE ON 
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION. 
The appellant asserts that since Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-503 a:ffects or in some way regulates the activities 
of resident aliens, it is preempted under the Supremacy Clause 
of Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution. 
The assertion continues that Congress has preempted the 
entire field of alien regulation, making any state regulations 
invalid. Appellant's rea~oning is .unsupported by case law ~r 
logic. Appellant recognizes that it is only in the field of 
immigration and naturali21.ation that federal law dominates, 
but fails to demonstrate any nexus between immigration and 
naturalization and the type of regulation involved here. 
Simply stated, the prohibition against the possession of 
firearms by aliens has nothing to do with, nor does it 
affirmatively or negatively impinge upon the federal regula-
tions concerning the immigration, naturalization, or 
registration of aliens. An examination of the law in this 
area reveals several standards used by the courts to 
determine whether state regulations are preempted by 
federal legislation. In Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 
373 U.S. 132 (1962), the Court enumerated these standards: 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(1) a state regulation is preempted wh~re an unambiguous 
congressional mandate exists to that effect; (2) preemption 
' 
exists where the state regulation cannot be enforced 
without impairing federal superintedence of the field; 
and (3) preemption of the state regulation exists where it 
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes of Congress~ Under any of these 
standards, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 is a proper exercise 
of this state's police powers and is not preempted by 
federal legislation. 
No unambiguous congressional mandate exists to 
preclude a state from regulating the possession of firearms 
by aliens; certainly the appellant has made no such showing. 
The appellant refers to 18 ~.S.C.App. § 1201-1203 (which is 
attached at the end of respondent's brief) in an attempt to 
make the requisite showing of an unambiguous congressional 
mandate. However, the language contained in these sections 
does not ·satisfy the "clearly unambiguous" standard directed 
at the states. · (i.e., in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator c-orp., 331 t 
218 (1946), the Court held that an examination of the legislati~ 
history of Section 29 of the United States Warehouse Act, 
7 U.S.C. § 241, et- seq., combined with language stating: 
"[T]he power, jurisdiction, and authority conferred upon the 
Secretary of Agriculture under this Act shall be exclusive. · 
was sufficiently unambiguous to meet the Court's preemption 
requirements.) As explained in the Congressional Record, the Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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federal statute was not directed at the ownership of 
firearms, but at the possession of firearms. 114 Cong. 
Rec. 14, 773-75 (1968). The Utah statute addresses the 
issue of ownership as well as possession. Moreover, the 
provisions were viewed in general as, "[N]ecessary to a 
coorindated attack on crime and also a good compliment to the 
gun-control legislation contained in title IV of this bill." 
114 Cong. Rec. 16,286 (1968). In sum, Congress has not 
provided the mandate necessary to restrict regulation, 
but rather has provided a regulatory basis for gun control 
in general which compliments existing state regulation. 
The appellant similarly fails to show that 
enforcement of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 impairs the 
enforcement of federal gun control laws or any immigration 
and naturalization requirements. Concerning this test, 
the Court in Florida Avocado Growers stated: "The test of 
whether both federal and state regulations may operate, 
or the state regulation must give way, is whether both 
regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal 
superintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed 
at similar or different objectives." 373 U.S. at 142. This 
authority is directly contrary to the appellant's unsupported 
assertion that, because 18 U.S.C. App. § 1201 contains 
restrictions on the possession of firearms, state regulation 
-13-
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in the same area must give way. Since enforcement of 
Section 76-10-503 in no way impairs federal irrnnigration 
and naturalization regulations, or federal gun control 
laws, the Utah state cannot be deemed to have been 
preempted. 
Likewise, the Utah statute does not stand as 
an obstacle to the purposes of Congress in the area of 
immigration and naturalization. In the case at bar, 
there is no reason to believe that irrnnigration will be 
discouraged or hindered by Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503. 
There is no state registratlon requirement as in 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), there is no 
burden on the employment of aliens as in Takahashi v. 
Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), nor is there 
any other obstacle to the federal purpose of promoting 
immigration and naturalization. Consequently, under any 
of the standards presently utilized to examine preemption, 
the propriety of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 must be upheld. 
This conclusion is consistent with the re·sult in the case 
of DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). There the 
Court upheld the constitutionality of a state stauute which 
prohibited an employer from knowingly employing an alien 
who is not entitled to lawful residence in the United States 
-14-
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if such employment would have an adverse effect on lawful 
resident workers. In response to the argument that the 
state statute was preempted by the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 8 u.s.c.· § 1101, et seq., the Court stated: 
"But the Court has never held that every state enactment 
which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of 
immigration and thus per se preempted by this constitutional 
power, whether latent or exercised." 424 U.S. at 355. The 
Court continued by stating that, "[S]tanding alone, the fact 
that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not render 
it a regulation of immigration, which is essentially a 
determination of who should or should not be admitted to the 
country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may 
remain." Id. at 355. The Colorado Supreme Court found this 
language equally applicable to a statute which prohibited 
resident aliens from voting in school board elections. 
In Skafte v. Rorex, 553 P.2d 830, 834 (Colo. 1976), the court 
noted that voter qualification was a primary example of an 
area which the states have historically occupied. Finding 
no conflict between the state statute and the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, and no congressional intent to remove power 
from the states in this area, the court concluded that only 
a demonstration that a complete ouster of state power was 
-15-
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the clear and manifest purpose of Congress, would require 
a conclusion of preemption. 533 P.2d at 834. Correspondingly, 
in the area of the exercise of state police power, the 
appellant has made no demonstration of congressional intent 
to completely eliminate the power of the state to regulate 
the ownership and possession of firearms by aliens. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-503 has not been preempted and its 
application in this case should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant's conviction under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-503 was proper and should be affimred. The appellant 
has failed to overcome the authority of this Court's decision 
in State v. Beorchia, as well as the authority of other courts 
which have upheld similar state laws prohibiting the possession 
or ownership of deadly weapons by aliens. See People v. 
Cannizzaro, 31 P.2d 1066 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934); People v. 
Cordero, 122 P.2d 648 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942); and People v. 
Mendoza, 60 Cal.Rptr. 5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967). (all construing 
a California law which was eventually repealed by the 
California legislature). 
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I Section 6 of the Utah Constitution confer only 
collective rights ·of firearm ownership and possession relating 
to the state's power to maintain a militia. Arguments that thes 
provisions support the appellant's individual right of possess~ 
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and ownership have been overwhlemingly· rejected by the courts. 
Furthermore since the appellant has failed to show 
congressional intent to eliminate state regulatory powers 
in the area of gun control through the Inunigration and 
Nationality Act, the state statute here involved is not 
preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OR RECEIPT OF FIREARMS 
· Pub. L. 90-351, title VII, §§ 1201-1203, June 19, 1968, 82 Stat. 236, as amended 
TITLE REFERRED TO Di D.C. CoDE 
Title vn of Pub. L. 90-351 is referred to in section 6-1802 of the District of Columbia Code 
§ 1201. Congressional findings and declaration 
Tne Congr~ hereby finds and declares that 
the receipt, possession, or transportation of a 
firearm by felons. veterans who are discharged 
under dishonorable conditions, mental incom-
oetents, aliens who are illegally in the country. 
and former citizens who have renounced their 
citizenship, constitutes-
Cl) a burden on commerce or threat affect-
ing the free !low of commerce. 
C2) a threat to the safety of the President of 
the United States and Vice President of the 
United States, 
C3) an impediment or a threat to the exer-
ci.ise of free speech and the free exercise of a 
religion guaranteed by the first amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States. and ( ~) a. threat to the continued and effective 
operation of the Government of the United 
States and of the government of ea.ch State 
guaranteed by article IV of the Constitution. 
<.As amended Pub. L. 90-618, title Ill. 
§ 301<::.>Cl), Oct. 22. 1968, 82 Stat. 1236.) 
.AME:h"DMENTS 
1968-:?ub. L. 90-618 substituted "discharged under 
dishonorable conditions" for "other than honorably 
Cischarged". 
En'EcTivE DATE OF 1968 .AMENDMENT 
Section 302 of Pub. L. 90-618 provided that: "The 
a.mendme-nts ma.de by paragraphs U> and C2) of sub-
section (&) of section 301 [amending this section and 
section 1202Ca)C2), Cb><2> of this Appendix] shall take 
efiect as of June 19, 1968.'' 
§ 1202. Receipt, possession, or transportation of fire-
P..ntlS 
(a) Persons liable; penalties·for violations 
Any person who-
< 1 > has been convicted by a court of the 
United States or. of a State or any political 
subdivision thereof of a felony, or 
(2) has been discharged from the Armed 
Forces mider dishonorable conditions, or 
. C3) ha.> bee:n adjudged by a court of the 
United States or of a State or any political 
subdiVi.sion thereof of being mentally incom· 
petent, or 
Page 1393 
C4) having been a ·citizen of the United 
States ha.s renounced his citizenship. or 
C5) being an alien is illegally or unlawfully 
in the United States, 
and who receives, possesses, or tra.nspo~ in 
commerce or affecting commerce, after the 
date of enactment of this Act, any firearm shall 
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned 
for not more than two yea.rs, or both. 
(b) Employment; persons liable; penalties for viola· 
tions 
Any individual who to his knowledge and 
while being employed by any person who-
Cl) has been convicted by a court of the 
United States or of a Sta'te or any political 
subdivision thereof of a felony, or 
(2) has been discharged from the Armed 
Forces under dishonorable conditions, or 
C3) has been adjudged by a court of the 
United States or of a State or any political 
subdivision thereof of being mentally incom· 
petent, or 
C4) having been a citizen of the United 
States has renounced his citizenship. or 
C5 > being an alien is illegally or unlawfully 
in the United States, 
and who, in the course of such employment, re-
ceives, possesses, or transports in commerce or 
affecting commerce, after the date of the enact. 
ment of this Act, any firearm shall be fined not 
more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more· 
than two yea.rs, or both. 
(c) Definitions 
As used in this title- . 
Cl) "commerce" means travel, trade. traffic, 
commerce, transportation, or communication 
among the several States, or between the Dis· 
trict of Columbia and any State, or between 
any foreign country or any territory or pos· 
session and any State or the District of Co-
lumbia, or between points in the same State 
but through any other State or the District 
of Columbia or a foreign co\intry; 
(2) "felony" means any offense punishable 
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 
year, but does not include any offense Cother 
than one involving a firearm or explosive) 
classified as a misdemeanor under the laws of 
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§ 1203 TITLE 18. APPENDIX-UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OR 
RECEIPI' OF FIREARMS 
a State and punishable by a term of imprison-
ment of two years or less; 
. (3) "firearm" means any weapon <including 
a starter gun) which will or is designed to or 
may readily be converted to expel a. projectile 
by the action of an explosive; the frame or re-
. ceiver of any such weapon; or any firearm 
mUffler or firearm silencer; or any destructive 
device. Such term shall include any handgun, 
rifle, or shotgun; 
(4) "destructive device" means any exPlO-
sive. incendiary, or poison gas bomb, grenade, 
mine, rocket, missile, or similar device; and in-
cludes any type of weapon which will or is de-
signed to or may readily be converted to expel 
a projectile by the action of any explosive and 
having any barrel with a bore of one-half 
inch or more in diameter; 
CS> "handgun" means any pistol or revolver 
originally designed to be fired by the use of a. 
single hand and which is designed to fire or 
capable of firing fixed cartridge ammunition, 
or any other firearm originally designed to be 
fired by the use of a single hand; 
(6) "shotgun" means a weapon designed or 
redesigned, made or remade, and intended to 
be fired from the shoulder and designed or re-
designed and made or remade to use the 
energy of the explosive in a fixed shotgun 
shell to fire through a smooth bore either a 
number of ball shot or a single projectile for 
each single pull of the trigger; 
<7> "rifle" means a weapon designed or rede-
signed, made or remade, and intended to be 
fired from the shoulder and designed or rede-
signed and made or remade to use the energy 
of the explosive in a fixed metallic cartridge 
to fire only a single projectile through a 
rifled bore for each single pull of the trigger. 
<As amended Pub. L. 90-618. title m. 
§ 301Ca)C2), Cb), Oct. 22, 1968. 82 Stat. 1236.> 
Date of enactment of this Act, ref erred to in subsea:_-_-
<a> and Cb) means June 19, 1968, the date of en.a.ctrnent" 
of Pub. L. 90-351. .. ,~ 
This title, referred to in subsec. Cc), means title Vll·~­
of Pub. L. 90-351, which is classified to sections 1201 to.::· 
1203 of this Appendix. ·i~lt 
AKENDMENTS ·:~;. 
1968--Subsec. <a><2>. Pub. L. 90-618, § 30l<a>C2), ~~ 
stituted "dishonorable" for "other tha.n honorable". ·"'~,­
Subsec. <b>C2>. Pub. L. 90-618, § 30Ha><2>. substituted.--? 
"dishonorable" for "other than honorable". · 
Subsec. <c>C2>. Pub. L. 90-618, § 30l<b>, restricteS--::: 
definition of the term "felony" so as not to inclUde- . 
any offense <other than one involving a firearm or ez.·:-: 
plosive> classified as a misdemeanor under the laWs Of''· 
a state and punishable by a term of imprisonment Of .• -
two yea.rs or less. .:.~-. 
~~~~ ..... -
EP'FEcnvE DATE OF 1968 AMENDMENT -~~ 
Amendment by section 301<&)(2) of Pub. L. 90-618~ 
effective June 19, 1968, see section 302 o! Pub. L. ~~ 
618, set out as an Eflective Date of 1968 Amendment~~ 
note under section 1201 of this Appendix. '! 
§ 1203. Exemptions 
This title shall not apply to- , ,.,,._-..... 
Cl) any prisoner who by reason of duties.-
connected with law enforcement has exp~ . .-
ly been entrusted with a firearm by compe:~· 
tent authority of the prison; and 
<2> any person who has been pardoned by~ 
the President of the United States or the . 
chief executive of a State and has exp~ 
been authorized by the President or such 
chief executive, as the case may be, to receive. 
possess, or transport in commerce a firearm. 
REFERENCES IN TEX'? 
This title, ref erred to in text, means title vn of Pub. · 
L. 90-351, which is classified to sections 1201 to 1203 of · 
this Appendix. 
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